College of William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications

Faculty and Deans

1969

Divorce Recognition - A Two-Headed Monster:
Full Faith and Credit Due Process
Richard A. Williamson
William & Mary Law School

Repository Citation
Williamson, Richard A., "Divorce Recognition - A Two-Headed Monster: Full Faith and Credit Due Process" (1969). Faculty
Publications. 455.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/455

Copyright c 1969 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs

DIVORCE RECOGNITION-A TWO HEADED MONSTER:
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT AND DUE PROCESS
I.

INTRODUCTION

The law of recognition of interstate divorce is dominated by
nineteenth century concepts of an agriculturally oriented, immobile
society that attached a certain stigma to the breaking up of the
family unit through divorce. Society has liberalized its attitude
toward divorce in this century, believing that the law should not force
people to live together against their will under tensions often more
damaging to children than actual separation of the parents. The
twentieth century has also fostered a mobile society where people
are capable of changing residences a thousand miles in a matter of
hours. Thus separation of the spouses into different states preceding
divorce is not an uncommon occurrence, nor is the practice of leaving the state of matrimonial domicil to obtain a divorce due to the
limited grounds available in that state. Often divorces procured in
this situation are ex parte in nature, the absent spouse being notified
by mail or by publicaion. In other cases, by prior agreement of the
parties the absent spouse retains an attorney in the forum state to
enter an appearance and admit allegations as to the complaining
spouse's domicil and often to admit the grounds for divorce. Against
this background, Mr. Justice Frankfurter commented on the usual
situation in the divorce court where the parties and their attorneys
engage in conduct that "in any other type of litigation, would be
regarded as perjury, but which is not so regarded where divorce is
involved because ladies and gentlemen indulge in it." 1
The breaking up of the marriage of two people often has
ramifications far exceeding the marital status of the spouses. Children
are affected, as are property rights and future heirs. As with any situation that affects the well-being of its residents, the state of matrimonial domicil is deeply concerned with an orderly marital
termination that to some extent permanently settles the rights and
duties of the parties. Uncertainty in recognition of the dissolution of
a marriage upsets the interest of the state and can have the effect of
illegitimatizing children, causing annulment of subsequent marriages, and causing problems in the distribution of property upon
the death of one of the parties.
A not totally unrealistic hypothetical situation will serve to
1

Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 367 (1948) (dissenting opinion).

311

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

312

[Vol. 30

focus the issues. H and W were happily married residents of State A
for ten years. They had two children and H had been successful in
acquiring a substantial estate. For a variety of reasons, the marital
relationship deteriorated to a point where H and fV saw that no
useful purpose would be served by continuing to live together. H
went to an attorney and was told that there were no grounds for
divorce in State A but that State B had very liberal divorce laws and
that he should have no trouble procuring a divorce there. H traveled
to State B, resided there for the necessary period, filed for divorce
and had W served by mail. W was perfectly willing to let H obtain a
divorce, since they had previously agreed to a divorce and had
worked out a property settlement agreeable to both, and did not
enter an appearance. H obtained the divorce uncontested and
returned to State A whereupon he immediately married D. Hand
D had one child before H died without executing a will. W, finding
her property settlement to be less attractive upon learning the extent of H's estate, brought an action to have H's second marriage
declared null and void and also to have H and W's marriage declared to be still existent since H had never established a domicil in
State B and therefore the purported divorce was of no validity in
State A.
The competing interests in the above situation are not easily
measured. State A has an interest in preserving the integrity of the
marital status of its domiciliaries. The marriage of H and W and H
and D were solemnized in State A; therefore, by general principles of
conflicts of law, the validity of each marriage is determined by the
law of State A.2 State A was also the domicil of H, and therefore
the law of State A will determine the ultimate distribution of H's
estate.
Competing against State A's interest in protecting its domiciliaries from having their marital status determined by an ex parte
divorce procured in a sister state is the interest of all states in protecting the integrity of judgments rendered in one state from collateral
attack in another state. Also competing against the interest of State
A is the desire to achieve certainty and finality in divorce cases so
as to avoid the situation described above. Once the legal status of the
parties has been finalized in one state, the parties should feel secure
and free to remarry in another state. Any solution to the problem
must take into account these factors.
A solution to the problem of the extra-territorial effect of
2

H.

GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF

LAws 228 (4th ed. Scoles 1964).
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divorce must also meet the requirements of the United States Constitution. The Constitution requires that "Full faith and Credit in
each State shall be given to the Public Acts, Records, and Judicial
Proceedings of every other State."3 The due process clause of the
Constitution requires the forum state to have jurisdiction of the
subject mater in order for its judgments to have validity outside as
well as within the forum state. Further, due process requires contacts with the forum state in order to validly bind a defendant who
is not personally served in the state and who otherwise does not
voluntarily enter a general appearance.

II.

THE BEGINNING--THE WILLIAMS CASES

Mr. Williams and Mrs. Hendrix were both resident domiciliaries of North Carolina. They left their spouses and went to
Nevada where they resided for the necessary si.'{ weeks and procured
ex parte divorces against their absent consorts, based upon constructive service. A decree of divorce was granted to both parties,
the court finding in each case
[T]he plaintiff has been and now is a bona fide and continuous resident of the County of Clark, State of Nevada, and had
been such resident for more than six weeks immediately preceeding the commencement of this action in the manner prescribed
by law.4

Immediately thereafter, Mr. Williams and Mrs. Hendrix married each other in Nevada and returned to live together in North
Carolina. Soon they were indicted on a charge of bigamous cohabitation, and both pleaded not guilty. As a defense, they offered in
evidence copies of the Nevada proceedings and claimed that the
divorce decrees and marriage in Nevada were valid in North
Carolina. They were convicted, and the judgment of conviction was
affirmed by the Supreme Court of North Carolina. 5 The state contended that since neither of the original spouses were served in
Nevada, nor entered an appearance therein, the Nevada decree
would not be recognized in North Carolina. The state also contended that the defendants had gone to Nevada for the sole purpose
of obtaining a divorce, not to establish a bona fide residence. For
these reasons, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that North
Carolina was not required to recognize the Nevada decree under
8
4
li

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 290 (1942).
220 N.C. 455, 17 S.E.2d 769 (1941).
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the full faith and credit clause of the constitution. On certiorari to
the Supreme Court of the United States, the conviction was reversed
and remanded. 6
The decision in the first William case represented a major
change in the law applicable to the recognition of out-of-state
divorces. The decision reflected a change in attitude on the part of
the Court as to the interests that should be protected when determining the validity of a divorce procured in one state against a domiciliary of another state. Prior to the first Williams case, the Supreme
Court had primarily concerned itself with the interest of the states
in protecting their domiciliaries against ex parte divorces obtained
in another state. The Court was less concerned with the possibility
that a person might be validly divorced in one state, yet remain
legally married in another state. In Haddock v. Haddock7 the
Supreme Court had held that a state is not required to give full
faith and credit to a divorce upon constructive service rendered in
another state unless the forum state was both the domicil of one of
the parties and also the matrimonial domicil of the marriage, or
unless the forum state's decision was based upon personal service
on the non-resident spouse. Previous to the Haddock case, the
Supreme Court had held that a decree in favor of a party in his
domicil, which was also the domicil of the other spouse until the
time Of separation, was entitled to full faith and credit, at least
when the facts negatived the right of the defendant spouse to acquire
a separate domicil. 8 This was true despite the facts that the decree
was rendered upon constructive or substituted service and the absent
spouse made no appearance. Thus the court had adopted what
became known as the "fault doctrine," that is, a divorce obtained by
constructive or substituted service was not entitled to full faith and
credit when the party "at fault" obtained a divorce outside the
matrimonial domicil despite a finding that the party obtaining the
divorce was domiciled in the state rendering the decree.
The Haddock case created much uncertainty as to whether a
divorce obtained in one state would be entitled to full faith and
credit and reflected an attitude on the part of the Supreme Court to
6 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942) [hereinafter referred to in text
as the first Williams case].
7 201 u.s. 562 (1906).
8 Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155 (1901). The court of appeals of New York
had affirmed a divorce brought by the wife, refusing to recognize a decree of divorce
obtained by the husband in Kentucky upon constructive service, despite a finding in
the New York court that Kentucky was the matrimonial domicil of the parties.
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protect the resident spouse at the expense of uniformity. However,
with the decision in the first Williams case, the Court eliminated
any requirement for a divorce to be entitled to full faith and credit,
aside from procedural due process and the necessity for one of the
spouses to be domiciled in the forum state. Even before the decision
in the Haddock case, the Court had stated that in order to have
jurisdiction in a divorce suit, one of the parties had to be domiciled
in that state. 0 The first Williams case decided that domicil of one
of the parties alone, without more, was sufficient to entitle a decree
to full faith and credit. No longer was it necessary to locate the
matrimonial domicil or determine which party was at fault, and the
Haddock case was specifically overruled.10
But Mr. Williams and Mrs. Hendrix's story did not end with
the decision in the first Williams case. After the decision, the parties
were again tried for bigamous cohabitation. This time the North
Carolina courts found the defendants were not domiciled in Nevada
at the time the divorce decrees were rendered. Therefore, the North
Carolina courts found that the Nevada court lacked jurisdiction of
the subject matter to render the decrees, and as a result, the divorces
were not entitled to full faith and credit. The defendants appealed
to the Supreme Court of the United States, but this time the court
affirmed the conviction.11 Whether it was under a due process theory
or an exception to the full faith and credit requirement, the court
held that North Carolina could inquire into the jurisdiction of the
Nevada court to render the judgment, and in divorce cases domicil
of one of the parties is essential to jurisdiction. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the majority, stated:
[T]he decree of divorce is a conclusive adjudication of everything
except the jurisdictional facts upon which it is founded, and
domicil is a jurisdictional fact. To permit the necessary finding
of domicil by one State to foreclose all States in the protection
of their social institutions would be intolerable.l2

Thus the decision in the second Williams case represents a step
backward from the first Williams case, and once again raises uncertainty as to the validity of migratory divorces. Nevertheless, the
court somewhat limited the uncertainty when it held that the burden
9 Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175 (1901); Stteitwolf v. Sttietwo1f, 181 U.S. 179 (1901).
10 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 293 (1942).
11 Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945) [hereinafter referred to in

as the second Williams case].
12 325 u.s. 226, 232.
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of proof in attacking the finding of domicil rests upon the party
attacking the validity of the divorce.18
The decisions in both the first and second Williams cases begin
with the assumption that domicil of one of the parties is necessary
in order for a state to render a decree of divorce.14 The requirement
of domicil of one of the parties to establish jurisdiction is a product
of the idea that a divorce proceeding is in the nature of an action
in rem.15 The marital relationship is the res and follows the domicil
of the parties. Thus the res can be located in two different places if
the parties have separated and have established domicils independent
of each other. Since the domicil of one of the parties in the forum
state provided the res, the court may proceed to dissolve the marital
relationship without in personam jurisdiction over an absent spouse.
The characterization of a divorce proceeding as an action in rem
eliminates much of the hardship that would necessarily result if
the court were required to have personal jurisdiction over the
defendant in order to render a valid decree. Obviously, the state has
an interest in dissolving the marital status of one of its residents
when the absent spouse has left the jurisdiction to whereabouts
unknown. It would be an extreme hardship in many cases to saddle
a spouse forever with the marriage relationship simply because the
absent spouse had left the state and to require the resident spouse
to journey to another state where the spouse can be personally
served in order to terminate the marriage.
The problem, of course, is that in selecting domicil as the nexus
13 325 U.S. 226, 233-234. The Court said: "The fact that the Nevada court found
that they were domiciled there is entitled respect, and more. The burden of undermining the verity which the Nevada decrees import rests heavily upon the assailant."
14 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942). Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking
for the majority said:
Domicil of the plaintiff • • • is recognized in the Haddock case and elsewhere
(Beale, Conflict of Laws, § 110.1) as essential in order to give the court jurisdiction .•.. 317 U.S. 287, 297.
In the second Williams case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said:
Under our system of law, judicial -power to grant a divorce-jurisdiction,
strictly speaking-is founded on domicil. [Citations omitted.] The framers of
the Constitution were familiar with this jurisdictional prerequisite, and since
1789 neither this Court nor any other court in the English speaking world has
questioned it. Domicil implies a nexus between person and place of such
permanence as to control the creation of legal relations and responsibilities
of the utmost significance. The domicil of one spouse within a State gives
power to that State, we have held, to dissolve a marriage wheresoever contracted. 325 U.S. 226, 229-30.
15 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 297 (1942).
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between the state and the res, one has selected a nexus that is subjective and dependent upon factors that are susceptible of various
interpretations. Domicil is dependent upon residence in the state
coupled with an intent to remain in the state indefinitely or permanently.1o A person, therefore, is incapable, at least theoretically,
of having two domicils at the same time.
Many state statutes do not speak in terms of domicil as a
requirement for divorce jurisdiction, but instead require that the
plaintiff have a residence in the state for a certain length of time.17
However, these statutes have been interpreted to include the requirement of domicil; thus they involve, in addition to actual physical
presence in the state for a certain period, an intent to remain in
the state indefinitely.1s
Since domicil is, at least in part, dependent on the intent of the
person involved, it is possible that different courts could make
different findings as to that intent, both decisions being supported
by the evidence. The second Williams case, by holding that a second
state may always inquire into the jurisdictional finding of the first
state, has opened the door for conflicting findings on the issue of
domicil, and thus, has left open the possibility that a person might
be legally divorced in one state and legally married in another state.
The Supreme Court evidently was aware of the problem raised by
its decision in the second Williams case, since it held:
Neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the full faith and credit
clause requires uniformity in the decisions of the courts of
of different states as to the place of domicil, where the exercise
of state power is dependent upon domicil within its boundaries.19
The long awaited confrontation between the states came in
1962 in the case of Colby v. Colby. 20 Husband and wife were both
domiciliaries of Maryland. The wife traveled to Nevada where,
after residing for the necessary period, she obtained an ex parte
divorce. 21 Two years later, the husband brought an action in Maryland and was awarded a separation, both parties being before the
16 E.g., Gage v. Gage, 89 F. Supp. 987 (D.D.C. 1950); Campbell v. Campbell, 57
So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1952); 36 A.L.R.2d 741 (1954).
1'1 E.g., Omo REv. ConE. ANN. § 3105.03 (Page Supp. 1967).
18 E.g. Saalfeld v. Saalfeld, 86 Ohio App. 225, 89 N.E.2d 165 (1949); Glassman v.
Glassman, 75 Ohio App. 47, 60 N.E.2d 716 (1944).
10 325 u.s. 226, 231 (1945).
20 369 P.2d 1019 (Nev. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 888 (1962).
21 Id. at 1020.
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court. The defendant wife contended that her Nevada divorce was
a complete defense to her ex-husband's action. The Maryland Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court's holding that, contrary to the
recital in the Nevada decree, the wife was never domiciled in the
state, the Nevada court was without jurisdiction, and its decision
was not entitled to full faith and credit in Maryland. 22 The husband
then went to Nevada and brought an action to vacate the former
decree of divorce, claiming that the Maryland decree was entitled to
full faith and credit in Nevada. 23 The trial court rendered summary
judgment for the husband, but the Nevada Supreme Court reversed,
holding that an ex parte decree is final within the state and full faith
and credit does not require a state granting a divorce to accept
another state's determination that it was without jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari,24 and thus,
left the parties in the awkward position of having their marital
status depend upon state lines.
The husband based his Nevada action on the Supreme Court's
holding in the case of Sutton v. Leib.25 In that case the plaintiff had
secured a divorce in Illinois with provisions for alimony until remarriage. Soon thereafter, she remarried in Nevada a person who had
obtained an ex parte divorce from his wife in that state. The former
wife of the plaintiff's new husband brought suit in New York attacking the Nevada decree. She obtained a judgment that the Nevada
decree was void. The plaintiff then brought suit in New York to
have her second marriage annulled. After the New York court
granted her annulment, she returned to Illinois and sued her first
husband for back alimony payments, claiming that the New York
decree determined that she had never been remarried. The court of
appeals held that the divorce and remarriage were still valid in
Nevada despite the New York court's decision and therefore, the
defendant's alimony was discharged.26 On appeal, the United States
Supreme Court held that Illinois was required to give full faith
and credit to the judgment of the New York court and the decree
was conclusive as to the marital status of the parties in all states,
including Nevada.27
Thus in the Colby case the husband's contention was that the
22 Colby v. Colby, 217 Md. 35, 141 A.2d 506 (1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 838 (1958).
Colby v. Colby, 369 P .2d 1019, 1022 (Nev. 1962).
371 u.s. 888 (1962).
25 342 u.s. 402 (1952).
26 188 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1951).
21 Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402, 408 (1952).
28

24
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Maryland decree rendered with both parties personally before the
court was entitled to full faith and credit in Nevada on the basis
of the holding in Sutton v. Leib.28 The Nevada court, however, distinguished the Sutton case, on the grounds that in that case the wife
had never had her marital status before the Nevada courts and that
the Supreme Court's statement in the Sutton case that Nevada
would have to grant full faith and credit to the New York decree
was dictum and not controlling.29
III. THE SHERRER AND CoE CASEs
In 1948 the Supreme Court limited the effect of its holding in
the second Williams case and held that full faith and credit bars a
litigant, who has appeared in an action and had full opportunity to
litigate the jurisdictional issues, from collaterally attacking the decision in another state when the decision is not susceptible of collateral
attack in the state where it was rendered. 30 In the Sherrer case, the
parties were both domiciliaries of Massachusetts. The wife left for
Florida in April, 1944, and in July, 1944, filed for divorce in that
state, alleging that she was a "bona fide legal resident of the State of
Florida."31 The husband received notice of the proceeding by mail
and retained a Florida counsel who entered a general appearance
for him denying the allegations in the petition, including the allegations as to the petitioner's residence. At the hearing, the husband
appeared personally and testified. The wife introduced evidence to
establish her Florida residence, and counsel for the husband failed
to cross examine on that issue or introduce evidence in rebuttal.
The wife was granted a divorce with the decree specifically finding
the wife "a bona fide resident of the State of Florida, and that this
court has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter in said
cause .... " 32 The husband did not appeal the decree. Immediately
thereafter, the wife remarried and returned to Massachusetts in
February, 1945. In June, 1945, the former husband instituted an action in Massachusetts to have the Florida divorce decree declared
void and to have the wife's remarriage declared void. The wife offered the Florida decree as a defense, but the court found that she
was never domiciled in Florida and granted the relief prayed for by
the plaintiff. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed on the

u.s.

28 342
402 (1952).
20 369 P .2d 1019, 1021 (Nev. 1962).

so Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
Id. at 345.
s2 Id. at 346.

Sl
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ground that the full faith and credit clause did not preclude the
trial court from re-examining the finding of domicil made by the
Florida court.33 The Supreme Court of the United States reversed,
holding that even though the defendant in the divorce action had not
actually litigated the issue of jurisdiction, the decree was res judicata
as to him in Florida, and therefore, could not be collaterally attacked
in another state.34
In Coe v. Coe, the companion case to Sherrer,3 'J the Supreme
Court held that where the defendant personally appears and admits
the allegations as to residence, the same principles apply.36 The
Sherrer and Coe cases are an extension of the earlier Supreme Court
case of Davis v. Davis,31 where it was held that a former decree of
divorce, based upon a finding of domicil after an actual contest
and litigation of that issue, is entitled to full faith and credit in
another jurisdiction and is not vulnerable to collateral attack. The
holding in Sherrer was based upon the idea that a person should
have only one opportunity to litigate an issue, and if he waives
that right, he will be forever forclosed from contesting the issue at a
later time. Actual litigation of the issue is not necessary; the person
need only have an opportunity to contest.
The Supreme Court expanded the holding of Sherrer in 1951, in
the case of Cook v. Cook. 38 In that case, the Vermont Supreme Court
affirmed an annulment of a marriage on the ground that the defendant was still married, even though the defendant had obtained
a Florida divorce. 39 The Vermont court held that the Florida court's
findings showed neither an appearance by the defendant spouse nor
personal service made upon him and that therefore, the Vermont
courts could relitigate the issue of domicil and find that the defendant was not domiciled in Florida at the time the decree was rendered.
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, holding that the
party assailing the Florida decree had not met the burden of proof
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 320 Mass. 351, 69 N.E.2d 801 (1946).
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 356 (1948).
35 334 u.s. 378 (1948).
36 Here, as in the Sherrer case, the decree of divorce was one which was entered
after proceedings in which there was participation by both plaintiff and defendant and
in which both parties were given full opportunity to contest the jurisdictional issues.
It was a decree not susceptible to collateral attack in the courts of the state in which
it was rendered.
37 305 u.s. 32 (1938).
38 342 u.s. 126 (1951).
39 Cook v. Cook, 116 Vt. 374, 76 A.2d 593 (1950).
33

34
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arising from the presumption of jurisdiction and that the Vermont
court must make an actual finding on the issue as to whether the
absent spouse personally appeared or was personally served in
Florida. The Court went on to hold that the Vermont court could
not rely merely on a statement that the Florida record showed no
service or appearance by the spouse in the Florida proceeding.
The Sherrer case precluded the spouse, who personally appeared
in the divorce proceedings, from relitigating the issue of domicil, if
barred by the law of the divorcing state. Later this rule was extended
by the Supreme Court to preclude attack by one not in privity with
the spouses. In johnson v. Jl.1uelberger, 40 the court held that when
the law of the divorcing state prevents a child from attacking a
divorce decree which the parent could not attack, that child cannot
collaterally attack the decree in another state consistently with the
principle of full faith and credit.
The question immediately arises as to what constitutes an
appearance in the divorce proceeding. Clearly, an actual litigation
of the domicil issue will prevent collateral attack. 41 It also appears
clear that when the defendant is personally served within the
jurisdiction, but makes no appearance, the decree is nonetheless
entitled to full faith and credit.42 The Supreme Court has yet to
decide a case where the defendant entered an appearance in the
proceeding without any participation, but a broad reading of the
Sherrer case would indicate that the critical question to be decided
is whether there was opportunity to litigate, and any authorized
appearance will prevent subsequent attack.
The holding in the Sherrer case also raises the very real pos·
sibility of collusion on the part of the spouses to obtain a divorce
forever binding in all states. Parties residing in a state with limited
grounds for divorce can travel to a state with more liberal grounds
and if the court does not question the issue of domicil, obtain a
divorce that should be binding on everyone. It should be clear that
a party who appeared in the proceeding or was personally served
within the jurisdiction of the state rendering the divorce decree
cannot avoid the rule of Sherrer by simply alleging fraud by the
other party in establishing the requirement of domicil. Othenvise,
40 340
41 E.g.,

u.s. 581

(1951).
Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938); Keller v. Keller, 212 S.W.2d 789 (Mo.

1948).
42

Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951); Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951);

In re Wynne's Estate, 194 Misc. 459, 85 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1948).
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the holding in Sherrer would be of no value, since a party could
always allege fraud. 43 However, the courts of at least one state have
held that Sherrer does not prevent subsequent collateral attack on
the issue of domicil even though both parties were before the court
when it is shown that there was active fraud on the part of both
parties in obtaining the divorce. 44 In Staedler v. Staedler4 5 the
parties entered into a separation agreement which contained, among
other items, an agreement by the wife to enter an appearance in
any divorce proceeding instituted by the husband. Also, the agree·
ment specified that if the wife opposed the divorce, the property
settlement would be void. The husband left the state and filed for
divorce in Florida. Before instituting the action, the husband sent
to the wife in New Jersey an authorization for her to sign, agreeing
to hire a Florida attorney to represent her in the action. She signed
the authorization and returned it to her husband. The Florida at·
torney :filed an answer for the wife and admitted, among other
things, the husband's allegations as to residence in Florida. The
Florida court rendered a decree of divorce in favor of the husband.
The husband returned to New Jersey and subsequently defaulted
on the terms of the original separation agreement. The wife in·
stituted a suit in New Jersey to have the Florida decree set aside
and to grant a divorce in her favor. The trial court found that the
husband never intended and did not establish a bona fide domicil
in Florida and therefore that decree was void. The court proceeded
to grant a divorce to the wife. The trial judge held that the Sherrer
case did not require that a decree be given full faith and credit where
the plaintiff acknowledged that it was obtained by fraud. The
decision went on to hold that Florida had no interest which would
be infringed by a refusal to recognize a decree obtained by fraud by
persons not domiciliaries of Florida. The Supreme Court of New
Jersey affirmed, stating:
We have carefully considered these cases [Sherrer and Coe]
and we do not believe that the full faith and credit clause of the
Federal Constitution was ever intended to be used as a shield
for or to give validity to the type of contract here under con·
sideration or to approve the acts performed pursuant thereto in
Heuer v. Heuer, 33 Cal.2d 268, 201 P .2d 385 {1949).
Staedler v. Staedler, 6 N.J. 380, 78 A.2d 896 (1951); Chirelstein v. Chirelstein,
8 N.J. Super. 504, 73 A.2d 680 (1950), modified on other grounds, 12 N.J. Super. 468,
79 A.2d 884 (1951).
45 6 N.J. 380, 78 A.2d 896 (1951).
43

44
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cases where the ultimate purpose was to commit a fraud upon
the jurisdiction of a court of one of the several sovereign states.4 6

It is interesting to note that the New Jersey court did not even
consider the question of the decree's validity in Florida against a
collateral attack on the same grounds, even though the Sherrer case
rested in part of the principle of res judicata in the state rendering
the decree.
In Donnell v. Howell 47 the North Carolina Supreme Court
was faced with a similar set of circumstances involving an Alabama
divorce. The decision declared the divorce void despite the fact that
the plaintiff had admitted in the divorce proceeding that his wife
had been an Alabama resident for the requisite length of time. The
North Carolina court discussed the validity of the decree in Alabama
and concluded that the Alabama courts would also declare the
decree void under the same facts and therefore, since the parties
were not precluded from attacking the decree in Alabama by
principles of res judicata, the North Carolina courts could declare
the decree void. 48 One of the cases relied on by the North Carolina
court in reaching that conclusion was a case in which the Alabama
Supreme Court said the principle of res judicata was applicable to
the jurisdictional findings but that the parties had waived that
objection by failing to raise it. 49
The District of Columbia judiciary have fallen into the same
trap as did the North Carolina court. In Gherardi de Parata v.
Gherardi de Parata50 both spouses were domiciled in the District of
Columbia. The defendant procured the wife's signature on a piece
of paper entitled "Acceptance of Service of Process and Answer
and Waiver of Respondent," with the waiver also stating the hus·
band was a bona fide resident of Alabama. The husband went to
Alabama for five hours during which period he instituted proceed·
ings for divorce. The Alabama court granted the divorce and later
the wife instituted an action in the Municipal Court of the District
of Columbia to affirm the marriage and declare void the Alabama
divorce which was procured by fraud on the issue of jurisdiction.
The husband defended on the ground that since both parties had
participated in the Alabama proceedings, the decree was entitled to
46
47
48
49

M

Id. at 391, 78 A.2d at 901.
257 N.C. 175, 125 S.E.2d 448 (1962).
Id. at 187, 125 S.E.2d at 454.
Hartigan v. Hartigan, 272 Ala. 67, 128 So. 2d 725 (1961).
179 A.2d 723 (D.C. Mun. App. 1962).
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full faith and credit. The trial court held for the husband, finding
that the wife had authorized an Alabama attorney to file the waiver
of service of process and therefore, the decree was res judicata as to
the issues. The Municipal Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
the wife had not sufficently participated in the action to confer
jurisdiction on the Alabama courts, and also, since Alabama courts
would have re-examined the jurisdictional question and since full
faith and credit requires that only the same effect be given a judgment rendered in another state as that state itself would give, the
courts of the District of Columbia would likewise re-examine the
jurisdictional findings.
Therefore, assuming Alabama courts would have applied the
principle of res judicata, if raised by one of the parties,51 the decision
of the District of Columbia court clearly violates the full faith and
credit requirement as enunciated in the Sherrer case.
These cases clearly show that the ramifications of the Sherrer
decision are as uncertain as the decisions in the two Williams cases.
Yet to be resolved are the questions of what is sufficent to constitute an appearance so as to afford an opportunity to litigate the
jurisdictional issue; what is the effect of collusion by both parties
in obtaining the divorce; and what is sufficent participation by one
party as to amount to active fraud in obtaining the decree. Does
the mere signing of a waiver of service of process amount to sufficient
participation as to invoke the Sherrer rule? If not, does authorization of an attorney to enter an appearance and admit the allegations
of the petition constitute fraud on the part of both parties and
enable a subsequent collateral attack in another jurisdiction as was
allowed in the Staedler case? At least one author has suggested that
the Sherrer decision and the subsequent cases expanding Sherrer
should be overruled, since to forbid a collateral attack on a foreign
divorce uses the full faith an4 credit clause to destroy its own
principle that each state is entitled to manage its own affairs.52
It is submitted that the weakness and uncertainty caused by
the Sherrer decision are a result of the insistence on the part of the
Supreme Court to keep domicil of one of the parties as a necessary
factor in order to establish a jurisdictional foundation. The uncertainty of the finding of domicil necessarily opens up a possibility
of a different finding on that issue on collateral attack, and in order
Id.
Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict of Laws: Simons, Rosenstiel, and Borax,
34 U. Cmc. L. REv. 26, 56 (1966).
51
52
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to establish some finality to divorce decrees, the Sherrer decision is
a necessary evil.
IV.

ALTERNATIVES

As pointed out above, the beginning point of all the Supreme
Court's holdings in this area has been that domicil of one of the
parties establishes the jurisdictional basis upon which a state can
dissolve the marital status. There are alternatives to domicil, such
as physical presence or residence which would provide the jurisdictional foundation required by the due process clause and also
eliminate the uncertainty surrounding the use of domicil. The
alternatives would create a basis to support the interest of the state
in protecting its residents against migratory ex parte divorces and
yet provide a degree of certainty to divorces, a vital necessity in an
area involving the legitimacy of children and the devolution of
estates. Even if the Supreme Court maintains its position that
domicil is a constitutional requirement, there exists an alternative
in the form advanced by the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act. 53

A. The Uniform Divorce Recognition Act
The Uniform Act was adopted by the N a tiona! Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform Laws and the American Bar Association
in 1948, not to do away with domicil as a jurisdictional requirement
but to discourage the migratory divorce. 54 Thus far, the act has been
adopted in only ten states. 55 The provisions of the act are as follows:
§ I. A divorce from the bonds of matrimony obtained in another
jurisdiction shall be of no force or effect in this state, if both
parties to the marriage were domiciled in this state at the time
the proceedings for the divorce was commenced.
§ 2. Proof that a person obtaining a divorce from the bonds of
matrimony in another jurisdiction was (a) domiciled in this
state ·within t1velve months prior to the commencement of the
proceedings therefore, and resumed residence in this state within
eighteen months after the date of his departure therefrom, or (b)
at all times after his departure from this state and until his
return maintains a place of residence within the state, shall be
prima facie evidence that the person was domiciled in this state
when the divorce proceeding was commenced.
9A U.L.A. 462 (1957).
Note, 16 HAsTINGs L.J. 121, 123 (1964).
5G California, Louisiana, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, North
Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin. The provision
has since been repealed in Louisiana. Id. at 124.
53

G4
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The effect of the first section is to recognize the rule that in
order for a state to terminate the marital status, one of the parties
must be domiciled within its borders. Section two of the act was
designed to add an element of certainty to the finding of domicil,
and to change the burden of proof if certain residence requirements
are not met and to make the divorce prima facie invalid. Whether
the later section conflicts with the holdings of the Supreme Court in
the second Williams case and subsequent cases would not seem to
be open to doubt. Consider the following language taken from the
second Williams case: "The burden of undermining the verity
which the Nevada decrees import rests heavily upon the assailant." 56
The act was most recently adopted in New York and has been
critized as raising serious due process problems, since a statutory
presumption must have a rational connection between the fact
proved and the ultimate fact presumed-in this case, lack of
domicil. 57 The usual interpretation of the meaning of domicil has
been that a person can establish a new domicil overnight, if he has
the proper intent.5s
The Uniform Divorce Recognition Act does not solve all of
the problems raised by the Williams cases and is subject to constitutional attack. The effect of the law in at least one jurisdiction
has been minimal.59 But the act does attempt to reduce the uncertainty caused by the use of domicil as providing the jurisdictional
basis for divorce. If applied by the courts, it would allow the parties
to assess their position before fleeing to another jurisdiction to
obtain a divorce.

B. Elimination of the Domicil Requirement
By far the most useful solution to the problems of uncertainty
would be the complete elimination of domicil as the basis for divorce
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, although expressly holding many
times that the state of domicil has exclusive power to terminate the
marital status, 60 has yet to face squarely a case in which the state law
has not required domicil of one of the parties in order to grant a
divorce. However, it would seem to be a fairly safe assumption, at
least at the time of the first Williams case, that the Supreme Court
325 u.s. 226, 233-34.
Note, 67 CoL. L. REv. 1320 (1967); Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953),
vacated as moot, 347 U.S. 610 (1954).
58 24 AM. JuR. 2n, Divorce and Separation, § 248 (1966).
59 Note, 16 HASTINGS L.J. 121 (1964).
60 E.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945).
56

57
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was using domicil in the constitutional sense as providing the jurisdictional basis to satisfy the due process clause and holding that full
faith and credit requires recognition of decrees meeting these
jurisdictional due process requirements. Nevertheless, it is still hard
to interpret the Constitution as requiring domicil rather than some
other factor as the nexus to give a state power to dissolve a marriage.
Factors such as physical presence, residence, location of the celebration of the marriage, and location of the place where the matrimonial
offense occurred might be used to provide the nexus.
The use of physical presence as providing the nexus would
have the advantage of certainty that is lacking with the use of
domicil, and a collateral attack on physical presence would be
next to impossible. It has been suggested by one author that the use
of physical presence as a basis for jurisdiction can be equated with
the situation involving the situs of a debt where it was once held that
the situs of a debt was the domicil of the debtor, but now is considered, for purposes of garnishment, to be where the debtor may
be found. 61
Mere residence in the jurisdiction might also be used as the
necessary nexus between the state and the marital status and like
physical presence, would eliminate. the necessity of inquiring into
the plaintiff's mental status to establish the jurisdiction. The states
have an interest in the persons residing within their borders without
regard to their state of mind and often, especially in resort areas, a
person will reside in that state for a longer period of time during
the year than in his state of domicil.
The state where the marriage was celebrated also might have
sufficient interest in the marital status to provide a basis for assertion
of jurisdiction to terminate the marriage. It is firmly established that
the validity of a marriage is to be decided by the law of the place
where it was celebrated.62 Why then should not that state also have
a sufficient interest to terminate the marriage? However, as has been
pointed out, the state of celebration is often a state where the parties
have only minimal contacts; this might be insufficient to support
jurisdiction.63
In tort law, the place where the alleged offense occurred generally
61 Sumner, Full Faith and Credit for Divorce Decrees-Present Doctrine and Possible Changes, 9 VAND. L. REv. 1, 19 (1955).
62 H. GooDRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws 228 (4th ed. Scoles 1964).
63 Sumner, Full Faith and Credit for Divorce Decrees-Present Doctrine and Possible Changes, 9 VAND. L. REv. I, 15 (1955).
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supplies the choice of law for purposes of conflict of laws, as well as
providing the requisite interest to support jurisdiction of the subject
matter. 64 Divorce law could be analogized to the tort situation, and
thus the state wherein the matrimonial offense occurred would have
sufficient interest to dissolve the marriage. But unlike physical
presence, residence, and location of the state where the marriage was
celebrated, the locus delecti is often hard to pinpoint and might
prove as troublesome as the use of domicil. 6 ;; Unlike the tort situation, the rule of reference and the rule of jurisdiction are the same
in divorce cases almost without exception. Domicil provides both
the basis for jurisdiction and the rule of reference as to what law
will be applied. This situation has led many to believe that the
whole problem of migratory divorces would be solved, not by revising the jurisdiction standards, but simply through a correct choice
of law on the part of the forum state. 66 Judge Hastie, in his strong
dissent in Alton v. Alton,67 suggested that due process does not
prevent the adjudication of a divorce action in any state when the
court has personal jurisdiction over both parties and the only question for the court to decide is whether the substantive law of the
forum can properly be applied.
The Alton case involved the constitutionality of a Virgin Islands
statute which provided in divorce actions (I) that si.">: weeks residence
would be prima facie evidence of domicil and (2) that where the
defendant was personally served within the jurisdiction or personally
appeared in the proceedings, the court would have jurisdiction to
grant the divorce without regard to domicil. The plaintiff in Alton,
after residing in the Islands for six weeks, filed suit for divorce and
the defendant entered a general appearance. The trial judge asked
the plaintiff for further proof on the question of domicil. The
plaintiff offered no further proof, and the action was dismissed. The
court of appeals affirmed the trial court, holding that the statute
violated the due process clause of the fifth amendment. The majority
concluded that domicil was the basis for assertion of divorce jurisdiction; therefore, it would be a violation of due process for one state
to alter the marital status between parties domiciled elsewhere.
64

H. GooDRICH, CoNFUCT OF LAws 165 (4th ed. Scoles 1964).

Sumner, Full Faith and Credit for Divorce Decrees-Present Doctrine and Possible Changes, 9 VAND. L. REV. 1, 21 (1955).
66 Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 684 (3d Cir. 1953) (dissenting opinion); Currie,
Suitcase Divorces in the Conflict of Laws: Simons, Rosenstiel, and Borax, 34 U. CHic. L.
R.Ev. 26, 48 (1966).
67 207 F.2d 667, 684 (3d Cir. 1953) (dissenting opinion).
65
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The court also declared invalid the first part of the statute's presumption of domicil after six weeks, finding no reasonable relationship
between the fact presumed and the fact creating the presumption.
Judge Hastie disagreed with the majority in both instances, concluding that the domicil requirement was a judge-made rule without
constitutional sanction, in addition to being a troublesome standard
that often works unfairly and causes serious social problems.68
Unfortunately, by the time Alton reached the Supreme Court
the parties had procured a divorce in their home state, and the
Court dismissed the question as moot. 69 However, in a later case
involving the same statute, the court of appeals again declared the
statute unconstitutional on the basis of its decision in Alton,7° and
this time the Supreme Court heard the cases on the merits. In a
five-three decision, it held the statute invalid but did not pass on the
due process question. Instead, the Court said the statute went beyond
the statutory authority delegated by Congress to the Virgin Islands
Legislature in that it did not deal with a subject "of local application"
but was designed to attract divorce seekers. 71 The Virgin Islands
Legislature has since amended its law, and now the plaintiff must
be domiciled therein and have resided in the Islands for at least six
weeks prior to commencement of the action. 72
A proper application of choice of law in the divorce field would
eliminate many of the objections that supporters of the domiciliary
requirement advance to perpetuate their beliefs. Jurisdiction based
on personal service or personal appearance by the defendant, coupled
with an appropriate choice of law, would serve to protect the interest
of the state of matrimonial domicil. Thus in the Alton case if it
appeared the parties were domiciled in Connecticut at the time of
the action and the alleged misconduct took place in the matrimonial
domicil state, then the Virgin Islands court, lacking connection with
the subject matter of the action, would be forced to apply the
divorce law of Connecticut. 73
Another possible solution to the problem, closely allied to a
proper choice of law, is the doctrine of forum non conveniens. A
court, when called upon to exercise jurisdiction over the domestic
problems of persons immigrating from distant states, would exercise
Id.
Alton v. Alton, 347 U.S. 610 (1954).
70 Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 214 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1954).
71 Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. I (1955).
72 V.I. STAT• .ANN. tit. 16, § 106.
73 Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 684 (3d Cir. 1953) (dissenting opinion).
68
69
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its discretion and decline or assume jurisdiction according to its
assessment of whether the state has a legitimate concern in the
marital status in question. But the Supreme Court has limited the
use of the doctrine and has placed the burden on the defendant to
establish a strong case for dismissal. Unless he so does, the plaintiff's
choice of forum is not to be disturbed.74 This doctrine has received
little application in the field of divorce other than in the District of
Columbia,75 where the judiciary has applied the doctrine where it
found that no property rights or other public interests were affected
in the forum state,76 when the crowded conditions of the court's
docket required prime consideration be given parties who of necessity were forced to use local courts,77 or when the court found that
the defendant would be amenable to service of process in another
jurisdiction where the action could have been prosecuted in a more
expeditious manner.7s

V. CoNCLUSION
In the field of divorce law, it is very possible for a state to become overly concerned with the necessity of protecting its residents
from migratory ex parte divorces procured by one of the spouses.
The result of the overzealous concern is that while eliminating one
evil, it has created a more serious problem that stril<.es at the foundation of familial relationships. Persons are legally married in one
state, while they are as legally divorced in another. Children are
legitimate in one state, yet illegitimate under the laws of another.
Persons are legally married in one state, yet guilty of bigamous cohabitation in another. A marriage is annulled in one state yet solemnized forever in another state.
A solution to the problem will not be possible until one of
two changes occur: (I) the Supreme Court eliminates completely the
necessity of founding jurisdiction on a finding that one of the spouses
is domiciled in state and substitutes in its place a relationship that
74 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking
for the majority said:
In all cases in which the doctrine of forum non conveniens comes into play, it
presupposes at least two forums in which the defendant is amenable to process;
the doctrine furnishes criteria for choice between them.
Id. at 506·507.
75 Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 545 (1966).
76 Clark v. Clark, 144 A.2d 919 (D.C. Mun. App. 1958).
77 Gill v. Gill, 193 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
78 Simons v. Simons, 187 F.2d 364 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 951 (1951).
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once shown is virtually impossible to impeach on collateral attack;
or (2) the Supreme Court decides that once a judgment of one state
has been successfully attacked in a sister state for lack of jurisdiction,
the original judgment is void everywhere, including the state originally rendering the decree.
The first alternative presents the best possible solution, and
many variations are possible, including a proper choice of law by the
state rendering the decree. The statute of the Virgin Islands, declared unconstitutional in Alton, represents one variation that was
attempted. The second alternative, while ~not eliminating the uncertainty involved in securing an ex parte migratory divorce, nonetheless would eliminate the difference in legal relationships which
are possible under the present holding in the second Williams case.
The first move must be on the part of the state legislatures, for
the Supreme Court can rule only if the question is presented. A
superficial examination of the present status of interstate recognition of divorce decrees should satisfy state legislatures that the solution rests in their hands to protect their citizens from the over~pro
tection they and the courts have been giving in the past.

Richard A. Williamson
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